Sun-tzu

1. Initial Estimations
2. Waging War
3. Planning Offensives
4. Military Disposition
5. Strategic Military Power
6. Vacuity and Substance
7. Military Combat
8. Nine Changes
9. Maneuvering the Army
10. Configuration of Terrain
11. Nine Terrains
12. Incendiary Attacks
13. Employing Spies
Nine Configurations
Four Changes
Two Questions
King of Wu's Questions



1. Initial Estimations

Sun-tzu said:

Warfare is the greatest affair of state, the basis of life and death, the Way (Tao) to survival or extinction. It must be thoroughly pondered and analyzed.
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Therefore, structure it according to [the following] five factors, evaluate it comparatively through estimations, and seek out its true nature. The first is termed the Tao, the second Heaven, the third Earth, the fourth generals, and the fifth the laws [for military organization and discipline].
The Tao causes the people to be fully in accord with the ruler. [Thus] they will die with him; they will live with him; they will live with him and not fear danger.
Heaven encompasses yin and yang, cold and heat, and the constraints of the seasons.
Earth encompasses far or near, difficult or easy, expansive or confined, fatal or tenable terrain.
The general encompasses wisdom, credibility, benevolence, courage, and strictness.
The laws [for military organization and discipline] encompass organization and regulations, the Tao of command, and the management of logistics.
There are no generals who have not heard of these five. Those who understand them will be victorious; those who do not understand them will not be victorious.
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Thus when making a comparative evaluation through estimations, seeking out its true nature, ask: Which ruler has the Tao?
Which general has greater ability?
Who has gained [the advantages of] Heaven and Earth?
Whose laws and orders are more thoroughly implemented?
Whose forces are stronger?
Whose officers and troops are better trained?
Whose rewards and punishments are clearer?
From these I will know victory and defeat!
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If a general follows my [methods for] estimation and you employ him, he will certainly be victorious and should be retained. If a general does not follow my [method for] estimation and you employ him, he will certainly be defeated, so dismiss him.
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After estimating the advantages in accord with what you have heard, put it into effect with strategic power (shin) supplemented by field tactics that respond to external factors. As for strategic power, [it is] controlling the tactical imbalance of power (ch'uan) in accord with the gains to be realized.
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Warfare is the Way (Tao) of deception. Thus although [you are] capable, display incapability. When committed to employing your forces, feign inactivity. When [your objective] is nearby, make it appear as if distant; when far away, create the illusion of being nearby.
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Display profits to entice them. Crate disorder [in their forces] and take them
If they are substantial, prepare for them; if they are strong, avoid them.
If they are angry, perturb them; be deferential to foster their arrogance.
If they are rested, force them to exert themselves.
If they are united, cause them to be separated.
Attack where they are unprepared.
Go forth where they will not expect it.
These are the ways military strategists are victorious. They cannot be spoken of in advance.
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Before the engagement, one who determines in the ancestral temple that he will be victorious has found that the majority of factors are in his favor. Before the engagement on who determines in the ancestral temple that he will not be victorious has found few factors are in his favor.
If one who fins that the majority of factors favor him will be victorious while one who has found few factors favor him will be defeated, what about someone who finds no factors in his favor?
If I observe it from this perspective, victory and defeat will be apparent.


2. Waging War

Sun-tzu said:

In general, the strategy for employing the military [is this]: If there are one thousand four-horse attack chariots, one thousand leather-armored support chariots, one hundred thousand mailed troops, and provisions are transported one thousand li, then the domestic and external campaign expenses, the expenditures for advisers and guests, materials such as glue and lacquer, and providing chariots and armor will be one thousand pieces of gold per day. Only then can an army of one hundred thousand be mobilized.
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When employing them in battle, a victory that is long in coming will blunt their weapons and dampen their ardor. If you attack cities, their strength will be exhausted. If you expose the army to a prolonged campaign, the state's resources will be inadequate.
When the weapons have grown dull and spirits depressed, when our strength has been expended and resources consumed, then the feudal lords will take advantage of our exhaustin to arise. Even though you have wise generals, they will not be able to ahieve a good result.
Thus in military campaigns I have heard of awkward speed but have never seen any skill in lengthy campaigns. No country has ever profited from protracted warfare. Those who do not thoroughly comprehend the dangers inherent in employing the army are incapable of truly knowing the potential advantages of military actions.
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One who excels in employing the military does not conscript the people twice or transport provisions a third time. If you obtain your equipment from within the state and rely on seizing provisions from the enemy, then the army's foodstuffs will be sufficient.
The state is impoverished by the army when it transports provisions far off. When provisions are transported far off, the hundred surnames are impoverished.
Those in proximity to the army will sell their goods expensively. When goods are expensive, the hundred surnames' wealth will be exhausted. When their wealth is exhausted, they will be extremely hard-pressed [to supply] their village's military impositions.
When their strength has been expended and their wealth depleted, then the houses in the central plains will be empty. The expenses of the hundred surnames will be some seven-tenths of whatever they have. The ruler's irrecoverable expenditures-such as ruined chariots, exhausted horses, armor, helmets, arrows and crossbows, halberd-tipped and spear-tipped [large, movable] protective shields, strong oxen, and large wagons-will consume six-tenths of his resources.
Thus the wise general will concentrate on securing provisions from the enemy. One bushel of the enemy's foodstuffs is worth twenty of ours; one picul of fodder is worth twenty of ours.
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Thus what [motivates men] to slay the enemy is anger; what [stimulates them] to seize profits from the enemy is material goods. Thus in chariot encounters, when ten or more chariots are captured, reward the firs to get one. Change their flags and pennants to ours; intermix and employ them with our own chariots. Treat the captured soldiers well in order to nurture them [for our use]. This is referred to as conquering the enemy and growing stronger.'
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Thus the army values being victorious; it does not value prolonged warfare. Therefore, a general who understands warfare is Master of Fate for the people, ruler of the state's security or endangerment.


3. Planning Offensives

Sun-tzu said:

In general, the method for employing the military is this: Preserving the [enemy's] state capital is best, destroying their state capital second-best. Preserving their army is best, destroying their army second-best. Preserving their battalions is best, destroying their battalions second-best. Preserving their companies is best, destroying their companies second-best. Preserving their squads is best, destroying their squads is second-best. For this reason attaining one hundred victories in one hundred battles is no the pinnacle of excellence. Subjugating the enemy's army without fighting is the true pinnacle of excellence.
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Thus the highest realization of warfare is to attack the enemy's plans; next is to attack their alliances; next to attack their army; and the lowest is to attack their fortified cities.
This tactic of attacking fortified cities is adopted only when unavoidable. Preparing large movable protective shields, armored assault wagons, and other equipment and devices will require three months. Building earthworks will require another three month to complete. If the general cannot overcome his impatience but instead launches an assault wherein his men swarm over the walls like ants, he will kill one-third of his officers and troops, and the city will still not be taken. This is the disaster that results from attacking [fortified cities].
Thus one who excels at employing the military subjugates other people's armies without engaging in battle, captures other people's fortified cities without attacking them, and destroys other people's state without prolonged fighting. He must fight under Heaven with the paramount aim of preservation.' Thus his weapons will not become dull, and the gains can be preserved. This is the strategy for planning offensives.
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In general, the strategy for employing the military is this: If your strength is ten times theirs, surround them; if five, then attack them; if double, the divide your forces. If you are equal in strength to the enemy, you can engage him. If fewer, you can circumvent him. If outmatched, you can avoid him. Thus a small enemy that acts inflexibly will become the captives of a large enemy.
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The general is the supporting pillar of state. If his talents are all-encompassing, the state will invariably be strong. If the supporting pillar is marked by fissures, the state will invariably grow weak.
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Thus there are three ways by which an army is put into difficulty by a ruler: He does not know that the Three Armies should not advance but instructs them to advance or does not know that the Three Armies should not withdraw and orders a retreat. This is termed entangling the army'.
He does not understand the Three Armies' military affairs but [directs them] in the same way as his [civil] adminstration. Then the officers will become confused.
He does not understand the Three Armies' tactical balance of power (ch'uan) but undertakes responsibility for command. Then the officers will be doubtful. When the Three Armies are already confused and doubtful, the danger of the feudal lords [taking advantage of the situation] arises. This is referred to as a'disordered army drawing another on to victory.
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Thus there are five factors from which victory can be known: One who knows when he can fight, and when he cannot fight, will be victorious.
One who recognizes how to employ large and small numbers will be victorious.
One whose upper and lower ranks have the same desires will be victorious.
One who, fully prepared, awaits the unprepared will be victrious.
One whose general is capable and not interfered with by the ruler will be victrious. These five are the Way (Tao) to know victory.
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Thus it is said that one who knows the enmy and knows himself will not be endangered in a hundred engagements. One who does not know the enemy but knows himself will sometimes be victorious, sometimes meet with defeat. One who knows neither the enemy nor himself will invariably be defeated in every engagement.


4. Military Disposition

Sun-tzu said:

In antiquity those that excelled in warfare first made themselves unconquerable in order to await [the moment when] the enemy could be conquered.
Being unconquerable lies with yourself; being conquerable lies with the enemy.
Thus it is said a strategy for conquering the enemy can be known but yet not possible to implement.
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One who cannot be victorious assumes a defensive posture; one who can be victorious attacks. In these circumstances by assuming a defensive posture, strength will be more than adequate, whereas in offensive actions it would be inadequate.
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Those who excels at defense bury themselves away below the lowest depths of Earth. Those who excel at offense move from above the greatest heights of Heaven. Thus they are able to preserve themselves and attain complete victory.
Perceiving a victory that does not surpass what the masses could know is not the pinnacle of excellence. Wrestling victories for which All under Heaven proclaim your excellence is not the pinnacle of excellence.
Thus lifting an autumn hare cannot be considered great strength; seeing the sun and moon cannot be considered acute vision; hearing the sound of thunder cannot be considered having sensitive ears.
Those that the ancients referred to as excelling at warfare conquered those who were easy to conquer. Thus the victories of those that excelled in warfare were not marked by fame for wisdom or courageous achievement. Thus their victories were free from errors. One who is free from errors directs his measures toward [certain] victory, conquering those who are already defeated.
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Thus one who excels at warfare first establishes himself in a position where he cannot be defeated while not losing [any opportunity] to defeat the enemy.
For this reason, the victorious army first realizes the conditions for victory, and then seeks to engage in battle. The vanquished army fights first, and then seeks victory.
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One who excels at employing the military cultivates the Tao and preserves the laws; therefore, he is able to be the regulator of victory and defeat.
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As for military methods: the first is termed measurement; the second, estimation [of forces]; the third, calculation [of numbers of men]; the fourth, weighing [relative strength]; and the fifth, victory.
Terrain gives birth to measurement; measurement produces the estimation [of forces]. Estimation [of forces] gives rise to calculation [the numbers of men]. Calculating [the numbers of men] gives rise to weighing [strength]. Weighing [strength] gives birth to victory.
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Thus the victorious army is like a ton compared with an ounce, while the defeated army is like an ounce weighed against a ton! The combat of the victorious is like ten sudden release of a pent-up torrent down a thousand-fathom gorge. This is the strategic disposition of force (hsing).


5. Strategic Military Power

Sun-tzu said:

In general, commanding a large number is like commanding a few. It is a question of dividing up the numbers. Fighting with a large number is like fighting with a few. It is a question of configuration and designation.
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What enable the masses of the Three Armies invariably to withstand the enemy without being defeated are the unorthodox (ch'i) and orthodox (cheng).
If wherever the army attacks it is like a whetstone thrown against an egg, it is due to the vacuous and substantial.
In general, in battle one engages with the orthodox and gains victory through the unorthodox. Thus one who excels at sending forth the unorthodox is as inexhaustible as Heaven, as unlimited as the Yangtze and Yellow rivers. What reach an end and begin again are the sun and moon. What die and are reborn are the four seasons.
The notes do not exceed five, but the changes of the five notes can never be fully heard. The colors do not exceed five, but the changes of the five colors can never be completely seen. The flavors do not exceed five, bu the changes of the five flavors can never be completely tasted. In warfare the strategic configuration of power (shih) do not exceed the unorthodox and orthodox, but the changes of the unorthodox and orthodox can never be exhausted. The unorthodox and orthodox mutually produce each other, just like an endless cycle. Who can exhaust them?
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The strategic configuration of power (shih) [is visible in] the onrush of pent-up water tumbling stones along. The [effect of] constraints [is visible in] the onrush of a bird of prey breaking the bones of its [target]. Thus the strategic configuration of power (shih) of those that excel in warfare is sharply focused, their constraints are precise. Their strategic configuration of power (shih) is like a fully drawn crossbow, their constraints like the release of the trigger.
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Intermixed and turbulent, the fighting appears chaotic, but they cannot be made disordered. In turmoil and confusion, their deployment is circular, and they cannot be defeated.
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[Simulated] chaos is given birth from control; [the illusion of] fear is given birth from courage; [feigned] weakness is given birth from courage; [feigned] weakness is given birth from strength. Order and disorder are a question of numbers; courage and fear are a question of the strategic configuration of power (shih); strength and weakness are a question of the deployment [of forces] (hsing).
Thus one who excels at moving the enemy deploys in a configuration (hsing) to which the enemy must respond. He offers something that the enemy must seize. With profit he moves the, with the foundation he awaits them.
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Thus one who excels at warfare seeks [victory] through the strategic configuration of power (shih), not from reliance on men. Thus he is able to select men and employ strategic power (shih).
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One who employs strategic power (shih) commands men in battle as he were rolling logs and stones. The nature of wood and stone is to be quiet when stable but to move when on precipitous ground. If they are square they stop, if round they tend to move. Thus the strategic power (shih) of one who excels at employing men in warfare is comparable to rolling round boulders down a thousand-fathom mountain. Such is the strategic configuration of power (shih).


6. Vacuity and Substance

Sun-tzu said:

In general, whoever occupies the battleground first and awaits the enemy will be at ease; whoever occupies the battleground afterward and must race to the conflict will be fatigued. Thus one who excels at warfare compels men and is not compelled by other men.
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In order to cause the enemy to come of their own volition, extend some [apparent] profit. In order to prevent the enemy from coming forth, show them [potential] harm.
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Thus if the enemy is rested you can tire him; if he is well fed you can make him hungry; if he is at rest you can move him. Go forth to positions to which he must race. Race forth where he does not expect it.
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To travel a thousand li without becoming fatigued, traverse unoccupied terrain. To ensure taking the objective in an attack, strike positions that are undefended. To be certain of an impregnable defense, secure positions that the enemy will not attack.
Thus when someone excels in attacking, the enemy does not know where to mount his defense; when someone excels at defense, the enemy does not know where to attack. Subtle! Subtle! It approaches the formless. Spiritual! Spiritual! It attains the soundless. Thus he can be the enemy's Master of Fate.
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To effect an unhampered advance, strike their vacuities. To effect a retreat that cannot be overtaken, employ unmatched speed. Thus if I want to engage in combat, even though the enemy has high ramparts and deep moats, he cannot avoid doing battle because I attack objectives he must rescue.
If I do not want to engage in combat, even though I merely draw a line on the ground and defend it, he will not be able to engage me in battle because we thwart his movements.
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Thus if I determine the enemy's disposition of forces (hsing) while I have no perceptible form, I can concentrate [my forces] while the enemy is fragmented. If we are concentrated into a single force while he is fragmented into ten, then we attack him with ten times his strength. Thus we are many and the enemy is few. If we can attack his few with out many, those who we engage in battle will be severely constrained.
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The location where we will engage the enemy must not become known to them. If it is not known, then the positions they must prepare to defend will be numerous. If the positions the enemy prepares to defend are numerous, then the forces we will engage will be few. Thus if they prepare to defend the front, to the rear there will be few men. If they defend the rear, in the front there will be few. If they prepare to defend the left flank, then on the right there will be few men. If they prepare to defend the right flank, then on the left there will be few men. If there is no position left undefended, then there will not by any place with more than a few. The few [are the ones] who prepare against others; the many [are the ones] who make others prepare against them.
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Thus if one knows the field of battle and knows the day of battle, he can traverse a thousand li and assemble to engage in combat. If he does not know the field of battle nor know the day for battle, then the left flank cannot aid the right nor the right flank aid the left; the front cannot aid the rear nor the rear aid the front. How much more so when the distant are some tens of li away and the near several li apart? As I analyze it, even though Yueh's army is numerous, of what great advantage is it to them for attaining victory? Thus I say victory can be achieved. Even though the enemy is more numerous, they can be forced not to fight.
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Thus critically analyze them to know the estimations for gain and loss. Stimulate them to know the patterns of their movement and stopping. Determine their disposition of force (hsing) to know the tenable and fatal terrain. Probe them to know where they have an excess, where an insufficiency.
Thus the pinnacle of military deployment approaches the formless. If it is formless, then even the deepest spy cannot discern it or the wise plans against it.
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In accord with the enemy's dispositions (hsing) we impose measures on the masses that produce victory, but the masses are unable to fathom them. Men all know the disposition (hsing) by which we attain victory, but no one knows the configuration (hsing) through we control the victory. Thus a victorious battle [strategy] is not repeated, the configurations (hsing) of response [to the enemy] are inexhaustible.
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Now the army's disposition of force (hsing) is like water. Water's configuration (hsing) avoids heights and races downward. The army's disposition of force (hsing) avoids the substantial and strikes the vacuous. Water configures (hsing) its flow in accord with the terrain; the army controls its victory in accord with the enemy. Thus the army does not maintain any constant strategic configuration of power (shih), water has no constant shape (hsing). One who is able to change and transform in accord with the enemy and wrest victory is termed spiritual. Thus [none of] the five phases constantly dominates; the four seasons do not have constant positions; the sun shines for longer and shorter periods; and the moon wanes and waxes.


7. Military Combat

Sun-tzu said:

In general, the strategy for employing the army is this: [From the time] the general receives his commands from the ruler, unites the armies, and assembles the masses, to confronting the enemy and encamping, there is nothing more difficult than military combat. In military combat what is most difficult is turning the circuitous into the straight, turning adversity into advantage.
Thus if you make the enemy's path circuitous and entice them with profit, although you set out after them you will arrive before them. This results from knowing the tactics of the circuitous and the direct.
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Thus combat between armies is advantageous; combat between masses is dangerous. If the entire army contends for advantage, you will not arrive in time. If you reduce the army's size to contend for advantage, your baggage and heavy equipment will suffer losses.
For this reason if you abandon your armor [and heavy equipment] to race forward day and night without encamping, covering two days normal distance at a time, marching forward a hundred li to contend for gain, the Three Armies' generals will be captured. The strong will be first to arrive, while the exhausted will follow. With such tactics only one in ten will reach [the battle site]. If you contends for gain fifty li away, it will cause the general of the Upper Army to stumble, and by following such tactics half the men will reach [the objective]. If you contend for gain at thirty li, the two-thirds of the army will reach [the objective].
Accordingly, if the army does not have baggage and heavy equipment it will be lost; if it does not have provisions it will be lost; if it does not have stores it will be lost.
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Thus one who does not know the plans of the feudal lords cannot prepare alliances beforehand. Someone unfamiliar with the mountains and forests, gorges and defiles, the shape of marshes and wetlands cannot advance the army. One who does not employ local guides cannot gain advantages of terrain.
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Thus the army is established by deceit, moves for advantage, and changes through segmenting and reuniting. Thus its speed is like the wind, its slowness like the forest; its invasion and plundering like a fire; unmoving, it is like the mountains. It is as difficult to know as the darkness; in movement it is like thunder.
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When you plunder a district, divide the wealth among your troops. When you enlarge your territory, divide the profits. Take control of the strategic balance of power (ch'uan) and move. The one who first understands the tactics of the circuitous and the direct will be victorious. This is the strategy for military combat.
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The Military Administration states: Because they could not hear each other they made gongs and drums; because they could not see each other they made pennants and flags.' Gongs, drums, pennants, and flags are the means to unify the men's ears and eyes. When the men have been unified the courageous will not be able to advance alone, the fearful will not be able to retreat alone. This is the method for employing large numbers.
Thus in night battles make the fires and drums numerous, and in daylight battles make the flags and pennants numerous in order to change the men's ears and eyes.
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The ch'i of the Three Armies can be snatched away; the commanding general's mind can be seized. For this reason in the morning their ch'i is ardent; during the day their ch'i becomes indolent; as dust their ch'i is exhausted. Thus on who excels at employing the army avoids their ardent ch'i and strikes when it is indolent or exhausted. This is the way to manipulate ch'i.
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In order await the disordered; in tranquility await the clamorous. This is the way to control the mind.
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With the near await the distant; with the rested await the fatigued; with the stated await the hungry. This is the way to control strength.
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Do not intercept well-ordered flags; do not attack well-regulated formations. This is the way to control changes.
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Thus the strategy for employing the military: do not approach high mountains; do not confront those who have hills behind them. Do not pursue feigned retreats. Do not attack animated troops. Do not swallow an army acting as bait. Do not obstruct an army retreating homeward. If you besiege an army you must leave an outlet. Do not press an exhausted invader. These are the strategies for employing the military.


8. Nine Changes

Sun-tzu said:

In general, the strategy for employing the military is this. After the general has received his commands from the ruler, united the armies, and assembled the masses:
Do not encamp on entrapping terrain.
Unite with your allies on focal terrain.
Do not remain on isolated terrain.
Make strategic plans for encircled terrain.
On fatal terrain you must do battle
There are roads that are not followed.
There are armies that are not attacked.
There are fortified cities that are not assaulted.
There is terrain for which one does not contend.
There are commands from the ruler that are not accepted. Thus the general who has a penetrating understanding of the advantages of the nine changes knows how to employ the army. If a general does not have a penetrating understanding of the advantages of the nine changes, even though he is familiar with the topography, he will not be able to realize the advantages of terrain.
One who commands an army but does not know the techniques for the nine changes, even though he is familiar with the five advantages, will not be able to control men.
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For this reason the wise must contemplate the intermixture of gain and loss. If they discern advantage [in difficult situations], their efforts can be trusted. If they discern harm [in prospective advantage], difficulties can be resolved.
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Accordingly, subjugate the feudal lords with potential harm; labor the feudal lords with numerous affairs; and have the feudal lords race after profits.
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Thus the strategy for employing the army: Do not rely on their not coming, but depend on us having the means to await them. Do not rely on their not attacking, but depend on us having an unassailable position.
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Thus generals have five dangerous [character traits]:
One committed to dying can be slain.
One committed to living can be captured.
One [easily] angered and hasty [to act] can be insulted.
One obsessed with being scrupulous and untainted can be shamed.
One who loves the people can be troubled.
Now these five dangerous traits are excesses in a general, potential disaster for employing the army. The army's destruction and the general's death will invariably stem from these five, so they must be investigated.


9. Maneuvering the Army

Sun-tzu said:




10. Configurations of Terrain

Sun-tzu said:




11. Nine Terrains

Sun-tzu said:




12. Incendiary Attacks

Sun-tzu said:




13. Employing Spies

Sun-tzu said: